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NOTES
TIME LIMITATIONS UNDER THE ARBITRATION LAW
The adoption of the New York Arbitration Law 1 some 33 years
ago was a basic reversal of the public policy of the state with refer-
ence to that extra-judicial method of settling disputes between con-
tracting parties. At early common law, the courts looked with dis-
favor upon arbitration proceedings as ousting them of their inherent
jurisdiction over the enforcement of contractual rights.2 It was
therefore a great step forward when the courts permitted the enforce-
ment of executed arbitration awards 3 even while continuing to show
disapproval by refusing to grant specific performance of executory
contracts to settle disputes by arbitration. 4 Bearing in mind the prin-
ciple that the law favors the amicable settlement of controversies with-
out resort to litigation, 5 and realizing that an enforceable system of
arbitration would substantially ease the volume of litigation continu-
ally burdening the courts, the New York legislature saw fit to enact
into one compact article of the Civil Practice Act 6 a just and work-
able means of achieving those aims.
In a manner parallel to, and complementary with, similar pro-
visions of the Civil Practice Act relating to actions at law and in
equity, the legislature enacted a series of time provisions, limiting the
period within which arbitration may be demanded or enforced, awards
may be confirmed, vacated, modified or corrected, service of. notice
will be effective, or jury trials of specified issues can be required. A
survey of the reported cases interpreting the arbitration law since its
enactment shows that a surprising volume of litigation arises out of
the conflict as 'to the meaning and effect of the aforementioned limi-
tations. Coupled with these statutory limitations are those adopted
by the contracting parties, the effect of which has up to the present
I Laws of N. Y. 1920, c. 275.
2 See Insurance Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445, 452 (U. S. 1874); United
States Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Trinidad Lake Pet. Co., 222 Fed. 1006, 1008(S. D. N. Y. 1915); Meacham v. Jamestown, F. & C. R. R., 211 N. Y. 346,
351, 105 N. E. 653, 655 (1914) ; Scott v. Avery, 5 H. L. Cas. 811, 853, 10 Eng.
Rep. 1121, 1138 (1856).
3 See Brazill v. Isham, 12 N. Y. 9, 15-17 (1854).
4 See RESTATEMtENT, CONTRACTS §§445, 550 (1932).
5 See Minehari v. Hill, 144 App. Div. 854, 858, 129 N. Y. Supp. 873, 876
(3d Dep't 1911).
a N. Y. CiV. PRAc. ACT Art. 84, §§ 1448-1469.
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been uncertain and conflicting in the various courts of the state. A
third type of limitation is that imposed by the court itself and exer-
cised out of its inherent equity powers. These are the limitations of
laches and waiver applied by the court whenever strict adherence to
the literal terms of the contract would place one of the contracting
parties in an inequitable position as a result of fraudulent or uncon-
scionable activity of the opposite party. It will be the aim of this
note to elucidate fully upon these three types of limitations-statutory,
contractual and court-applied-and to synthesize a working rule to be
applied by the practitioner when confronted with such provisions in
arbitration cases.
Statutory
The first time provision confronting the contracting party is that
requiring eight days' written notice of an application for a court order
directing arbitration.7 Such application is the remedy available to a
party who wishes to avail himself of an arbitration provision in the
contract where the opposite party neglects, refuses or otherwise fails
to perform the contract or to submit the resulting controversy to
arbitration. This remedy is perhaps the most fundamental distinc-
tion between the statutory and common-law forms of arbitration since
it permits the enforcement of an executory arbitration contract which
was impossible at common law.
If the defaulting party contests the application for the order
directing arbitration, he may, upon the hearing, set forth facts tending
to show that no contract was made or that there has been no failure
to comply with the contract. If the evidence adduced raises a sub-
stantial question as to these issues, the court will direct a trial of the
same. At this point, a second time limitation is applicable. In the
absence of a timely demand to the contrary, the court alone will hear
and determine the issues. But where the issues have been raised,
any party may within five days after service of the order directing
a trial of the issues, demand that a jury trial be had, and in such case,
the court will refer the issues to a jury in the manner provided by law
for the reference to a jury in equity actions.8
In the event that the court or jury finds that there was a con-
tract and that there has been a failure to comply with it, the court
will then order the reneging party to proceed to arbitration. At this
point, the arbitrators for the first time begin to function. It is their
duty to nominate a time and place for the hearing, either in accor-
dance with the terms of the contract, 9 or, if none be specified, then
by majority vote. If the arbitrators refuse or fail to do so, the court
7 Id. § 1450.
8 Ibid.
9 Id. § 1454(2).
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may direct that they proceed promptly with the hearing.10 In order
that neither party be subjected to a default award through fraud or
inadvertence, the statute enacts a third time provision requiring five
days' written notice of the beginning of hearings to be served per-
sonally or by registered mail upon both parties." It would appear
that failure of the arbitrators to cause such notice to be given will
deprive them of jurisdiction, and render the award void upon timely
objection by the aggrieved party.
Frequently, however, a party who believes that he is bound by
no arbitration contract, or that there is no controversy to be settled,
will ignore a demand for arbitration tendered by his opponent, and
he may likewise boycott the arbitration hearings instigated by the
latter. In doing so, however, with full knowledge of the proceedings,
he places himself in the precarious position of being bound by a
default award if he should fail to object timely to the arbitration.
This he may do in two ways-first, by a motion for a stay of the
proceedings, or, second, in opposition to a motion to confirm. 12 But
in order to protect a bona fide claimant from the expense of conduct-
ing arbitration only to find that the defaulting party successfully
raises the issues of no contract or no failure of performance late in
the hearings or even upon the motion to confirm, the statute provides
limits upon that right.13 It states in substance that if a notice of
intention to arbitrate be personally served upon the defaulting party,
then those issues can only be raised by a motion to stay, notice of
which must be served within ten days after service of notice of in-
tention to arbitrate. It has been held that this time requirement is
in the nature of a statute of limitations and that failure to serve such
a notice within the ten-day period will preclude the petitioner from
thereafter putting in issue the making of the contract.' 4 On the other
hand, while an application for a stay was denied for non-compliance,
the court did so without prejudice to petitioner's right to open his
default upon a showing of the existence of merits and a good excuse
for the default.15
In 1939, the Court of Appeals in the leading case of Schafran &
Finkel, Inc. v. Loewenstein & Sons, Inc.'0 reversed the Appellate
Division ' 7 judgment which had barred the petitioner from putting
in issue the making of the contract where he had not, within ten days
'old. § 1454(3).
11 Id. § 1454(2).
121d. § 1458(2).
13 Ibid.
14Bluds v. Madison Merc. Prod., Inc., 127 N. Y. L. J. 265, col. 1 (Sup.
Ct. Jan. 21, 1952).Is Will Steinman, Inc. v. Sidney Blumenthal & Co., 99 N. Y. L. J. 2451,
col. 2 (Sup. Ct. May 20, 1938).16280 N. Y. 164, 19 N. E. 2d 1005 (1939).
17254 App. Div. 218, 4 N. Y. S. 2d 693 (1st Dep't 1938).
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after notice of intention to arbitrate, served a motion to stay. The
court stated that such an interpretation of the statute would be vio-
lative of the Fourteenth Amendment in that the notice of intention
to arbitrate did not sufficiently apprise the respondent of the result
of his failure to act. The court, therefore, granted petitioner relief
in equity. As a result of this decision and of two cases following it
that same year,'8 the legislature undertook to correct this defect by
an amendment which required that the notice, in order to effectuate
its purpose of requiring the respondent to raise the issues within ten
days or not at all, should substantially state the consequences of fail-
ure to act.19 Not until 1946 was the statute again attacked, at which
time it was held by a unanimous court that the amendment success-
fully satisfied the requirements of due process. 20 Failure of the party
seeking arbitration to comply with the amended statute will render
the preclusionary feature of the statute void and permit the objecting
party to raise the issues even as late as the motion to confirm.21 As
observed supra,22 where the issues are raised at the hearing of the
motion for an order directing arbitration pursuant to Section 1450,
any party may demand a jury trial of the issues within five days of
an order directing a trial of them. Similarly, where the issues are
raised by a motion to stay or upon motion to confirm, either party
may demand a jury trial of the issues, 23 and by a 1953 amendment,24
the time for so demanding has been brought in line with that desig-
nated in Section 1450.
Assuming, then, the execution of a contract, the existence of an
arbitrable controversy and the jurisdiction of the arbitrators, the
validity and effect of the award must be considered. It should be
noted that in order to enforce a statutory award, not only must the
award be in writing, but it must be subscribed by the arbitrators
within the time limit specified in the contract or submission.25 It has
frequently been held that such a limit is not a basic part of the con-
tract and may therefore be substantially, rather than literally, com-
plied with.2 6 The theory behind such a position is that to deny en-
forcement of an award, concededly valid when made, merely because
18 Hesslein & Co. v. Greenfield, 281 N. Y. 26, 22 N. E. 2d 149 (1939);
Bernson Silk Mills v. M. S. Siegel & Co., 256 App. Div. 617, 11 N. Y. S. 2d
74 (1st Dep't 1939).
19 Laws of N. Y. 1939, c. 573.
20 MacNamara v. Doubleday, 270 App. Div. 645, 62 N. Y. S. 2d 369 (3d
Dep't 1946).
21 Matter of Onondaga Silk Co. (Roseville Frocks, Inc.), 194 Misc. 326,
86 N. Y. S. 2d 154 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
22 See note 8 supra.
23 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 1458(2).
24 Laws of N. Y. 1953, c. 558.
25 N. Y. CIv. PRAC. Acr § 1460.
26 Hegeberg v. New England Fish Co., 7 Wash. 2d 509, 110 P. 2d 182
(1941), and cases cited therein.
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the arbitrators failed to subscribe it within the exact time limit, al-
though within a reasonable time, not only would frustrate the prob-
able intention of the parties, but would also cause a waste of the time
and expense of the arbitration proceeding. It appears, however, that
in New York, the courts would demand strict literal compliance with
the statute. While no reported case directly on this point can be
found, language used by the Court of Appeals in Matter of Broadway-
40th St. Corp. (Manhattan Co.) 27 would suggest such a position.
There the court was dealing with a contract requiring an award to
be made not later than October 1, and the petitioner failed to request
arbitration until November 19. In denying petitioner's request, the
court stated that since no valid award could be made under such cir-
cumstances, petitioner was not entitled to an order directing arbitra-
tion. But since in that case there was a gross variance between the
contract limitation and the date on which arbitration was actually
demanded, a serious question of laches and waiver was present and
thus the case may not be determinative of a situation in which the
variance was de ntinimis and otherwise reasonable. In fact, it has
been held that where one party so acts as to prevent the arbitrators
from rendering a decision prior to the contract date, he is deemed to
have waived the requirement and will be ordered to proceed with
arbitration.
2 8
In order that the award may be enforced, judgment must be
entered thereon after it has been confirmed, modified or corrected by
order of the court.29 The statute, however, places certain limits upon
the time during which such orders may be obtained. Pursuant to
the 1953 amendment 8 0 of Section 1461, a motion to confirm the
award must be made by any party to the contract within one year
after the filing or delivery of the award. Similarly, notice of motion
to modify or correct the award, as well as to vacate it, must be served
upon the adverse party within three months after the award is filed
or delivered.3 ' While there have been no reported cases interpreting
the one-year requirement of Section 1461, it has been conclusively
established that the three months' requirement of Section 1463 is in
the nature of a statute of limitations, the provisions of which may not
be disregarded.3
2
27296 N. Y. 165, 71 N. E. 2d 451 (1947), affirming 271 App. Div. 219,
62 N. Y. S. 2d 888 (1st Dep't 1946).
28 Matter of Elkin, 108 N. Y. L. J. 185, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. July 23, 1942).
29 i. Y. Civ. PmAC. AcT § 1464.
30 Laws of N. Y. 1953, c. 570.
31 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 1463.
32 Matter of Heidelberger v. Cooper, 300 N. Y. 502, 89 N. E. 2d 21 (1949);
Matter of Bond v. Shubert, 264 App. Div. 484, 36 N. Y. S. 2d 147 (3d Dep't
1942), aff'd inem., 290 N. Y. 901, 50 N. E. 2d 299 (1943); see Matter of
49th St. Properties, Inc. (Dibrienza), 119 N. Y. L. J. 2076, col. 4 (Sup. Ct.
June 3, 1948) ; 43rd St. Cafe, Inc. v. Volga Estates, Inc., 119 N. Y. L. J. 2056.
col. I (Sup. Ct. June 2, 1948), aff'd mere.. 277 App. Div. 759, 97 N. Y. S. 2d
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In an effort to circumvent the force of such a unanimous line
of holdings, it was urged that this limitation applied only to motions
to vacate, modify or correct the award. In the companion cases of
Dick's Restaurant & Bar v. Rosenwasser 33 and Matter of Owen-
Davis Stores, Inc. (Wallenstein) ,34 this argument was squarely placed
before the Supreme Court of New York County. In the Rosen-
wasser case, the defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff's action to
vacate the award on the ground that plaintiff was remitted solely to
his remedy under Section 1463, and since he failed to move to vacate
the award within three months, he could not then seek relief in an
action at law. The court denied defendant's motion and stated that
since no valid award was made, but only a fabricated arbitration to
defeat the Emergency Rent Laws, plaintiff would not be barred from
bringing an action to correct the wrong so as to carry out the purpose
of the circumvented laws. Upon appeal, the order was affirmed 35
unanimously but with the caveat that the court did not wish to in-
dicate what, if any, relief plaintiff could have. In the Wallenstein
case, decided by the same court, and dealing with a controversy iden-
tical with that treated in the Rosenwasser case, petitioner's motion
to vacate the award was denied. The court distinguished its earlier
holding by stating that since the instant case decided a motion, it
was bound by the long line of decisions holding Section 1463 to be
a statute of limitations. 6 But since the Rosenwasser case involved
a plenary action, the mentioned section was inapplicable and no limit
other than that indicated in Article 2 of the Civil Practice Act applied.
This fiction, however, was short-lived. In the case of Raven
Electric Co. v. Linzer,37 the Appellate Division in the First Depart-
ment followed the reasoning of the Rosenwasser case. Upon appeal,
however, the Appellate Division was reversed by the Court of
Appeals.38 There it was held that the only way to vacate an award
is by motion pursuant to Section 1463 and that the three months'
limitation cannot be obviated by bringing a plenary action to vacate
the award.3 9 It has likewise been held that even where fraud and
394 (1st Dep't 1950) ; Matter of American Veterans Comm. (Omaha Estates,
Inc.), 119 N. Y. L. J. 1443, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. April 19, 1948); Kempner v.
F. & G. Leather Garments Co., 117 N. Y. L. J. 2455, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. June 21,
1947) ; Herbert v. Charles Miller Coat Co., 117 N. Y. L. J. 1932, col. 5 (Sup.
Ct. May 16, 1947) ; Matter of Mayo Realty Corp., 68 N. Y. S. 2d 843 (Sup.
Ct.. 1947).
3 195 Misc. 179, 89 N. Y. S. 2d 18 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
34 195 Misc. 180, 89 N. Y. S. 2d 20 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
35275 App. Div. 832, 89 N. Y. S. 2d 922 (1st Dep't 1949).
36 See note 32 supra.
37275 App. Div. 1032, 92 N. Y. S. 2d 405 (1st Dep't 1950).
-8 302 N. Y. 188, 97 N. E. 2d 746 (1951).39 Accord, Estro Chem. Co. v. Falk, 303 N. Y. 83, 100 N. E. 2d 146 (1951);
Feinberg v. Barry Equity Corp., 277 App. Div. 762, 97 N. Y. S. 2d 570 (1st
Dep't 1950), aff'd mem., 302 N. Y. 676, 98 N. E. 2d 480 (1951); Laurel Print-
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corruption is charged, Section 1463 is the exclusive remedy 40 and
that exception and appeal is an improper and ineffectual method of
attacking or reviewing an award.
41
The only exception provided by the statute to the time require-
ments for the bringing of a motion to confirm, vacate, modify or cor-
rect an award is that found in Section 1468. This provision permits
a judge of the court to make an order extending the prescribed periods
whenever a party dies after making a submission or contract of arbi-
tration and it is begun or continued by his executor or administrator
or other lawfully designated persons. This provision brings the arbi-
tration statute into line with the pertinent non-abatement provisions
of the Civil Practice Act for the survival of actions at law.
42
Contractual
Statutes of limitations represent the legislative determination of
the maximum time within which actions may be commenced. Their
purpose is several: to prevent the enforcement of stale claims; to
outlaw actions slept on until witnesses are dead, testimony forgotten
and evidence obscure.43 Such statutes have been characterized as
statutes of repose 44 which, without affecting the right, deny the
remedy.45 The New York statute 46 provides that the limitations
shall apply except in those cases where a different period is prescribed
by law or where a shorter limitation is prescribed by the written
agreement of the parties. It may thus be seen that contractual pro-
visions may effectively shorten the period within which an action may
be commenced. The effect of such provisions in arbitration contracts
has for many years been the source of much litigation. The deci-
sions of the courts have been by no means harmonious, and may be
reduced to three general categories. The first leading case on this
subject is Application of Ketchum & Co.,47 decided in 1947, which
is typical of the view that such provisions are in the nature of stat-
utes of limitations which must be strictly enforced. 48 In the very
ing Co. v. Starrett Realty Renting Co., 198 Misc. 385, 100 N. Y. S. 2d 189
(Sup. Ct. 1950); cf. Apex Binding Corp. v. Relkin, 198 Misc. 381, 97 N. Y. S.
2d 85 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
40 Matter of Mayo Realty Corp., 68 N. Y. S. 2d 843 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
41 Matter of Wilkins, 169 N. Y. 494, 62 N. E. 575 (1902).
42 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr §§ 82, 84, 85, 86, 88, 89, 478, 1131; see also N. Y.
DEc. EsT. LAW § 118.
43 See Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U. S. 304, 314 (1945).
44 See Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 270 N. Y. 287, 302,
200 N. E. 824, 827 (1936) ; Wolfson v. Syracuse Newspapers, Inc., 254 App.
Div. 211, 213, 4 N. Y. S. 2d 640, 642 (4th Dep't 1938).45 See Campbell v. Holt, 115 U. S. 620, 625 et seq. (1885).
46 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 10.
47 70 N. Y. S. 2d 476 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
48,Accord, Matter of Shine's Restaurant (Waiters and Waitresses Union),
127 N. Y. L. J. 1017, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. Mar. 13, 1952).
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same year, this precise question again came before the courts in two
cases 49 which established what might be called the middle view. It
was argued in one of these cases that the five-day period within
which arbitration must be requested was a short statute of limita-
tions, failure to comply with which barred an application to compel
arbitration. In granting the application, the court stated that it was
unable to adopt this contention and that in its opinion, the provision
was merely a condition which need only be substantially complied
with.50 The question of such compliance was one not for the courts,
but for the arbitrators. In the other case, the court, facing a similar
five-day limitation, held that the arbitration clause which provided
that any controversy arising out of or in relation to the contract
should be settled by arbitration was sufficiently broad to cover the
controversy as to whether the demand for arbitration had been timely
made.51 In the following year, the issue was first presented to an
appellate court. In a per curiam decision, it was held that an arbi-
tration clause which stated that all claims were to be made within
ten days after receipt of goods was not a statute of limitations where
a claim was made upon discovery of the defect some 27 days after
receipt.52 In so holding, the court adopted the middle view when it
stated that "[w]hether the claim made by petitioners . . . should be
allowed . . . is a matter for determination by the arbitrators." 53 In
1951, the third view was first definitively adopted in Matter of Con-
stitution Square, Inc.54 Here the court was faced with a building
contract which provided that demand for arbitration must be made
within ten days after the arising of a controversy. Although no de-
mand was made until 24 days thereafter, an application for com-
pulsory arbitration was granted and it was held that the clause did
not constitute a statute of limitations. Here the court itself con-
4 Matter of Rabinowitz (Union News Co.), 118 N. Y. L. J. 988, col. 1
(Sup. Ct. Oct. 23, 1947) ; Matter of Rhea Mfg. Co. (Associated Lace Corp.),
117 N. Y. L. J. 1735, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. May 3, 1947).5o Matter of Rabinowitz (Union News Co.), supra note 49.
51 Matter of Rhea Mfg. Co. (Associated Lace Corp.), supra note 49.
52 Matter of Tuttman (Kattan, Talamas Export Corp.), 274 App. Div. 395,
83 N. Y. S. Zd 651 (1st Dep't 1948).
53 Id. at 396, 83 N. Y. S. 2d at 652. Accord, Matter of Compagnie Fran-
caise des Petroles (Pantepec Oil Co.), 279 App. Div. 851, 110 N. Y. S. 2d 1
(1st Dep't 1952), aff'd inern., 305 N. Y. 588, 111 N. E. 2d 645 (1953) ; Gramil
Weaving Corp. v. A. M. Brettler & Co., 121 N. Y. L. J. 884, col. 2 (Sup. Ct.
Mar. 10, 1949); Princeton Rayon Corp. v. Barr Bros. Dresses, Inc., 121
N. Y. L. J. 1033, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. Mar. 22, 1949).
54 125 N. Y. L. J. 355, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 29, 1951), aff'd nem., 279
App. Div. 912, 110 N. Y. S. 2d 912 (2d Dep't 1952); see also A. B. Barr &
Co. v. Municipal Housing Auth., 86 N. Y. S. 2d 765 (Sup. Ct. 1949), aff'd
mere., 276 App. Div. 981, 95 N. Y. S. 2d 352 (2d Dep't 1950). Compare
Diamond Exchange v. H. A. Levanne Co., 128 N. Y. L. J. 1561, col. 5 (Sup.
Ct. Dec. 22, 1952), wherein the court denominated the contractual provision
a short-term statute of limitations but refused to consider it a bar to the
arbitration.
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sidered the timeliness of the demand as opposed to those cases con-
stituting the middle view which referred that question to the
arbitrators.
Although no decisions have been reported out of the Third and
Fourth Departments, it can be seen that confusion exists as to the
effect of such provisions even within the First and Second Depart-
ments. Some observations are therefore in order. Where the parties
have gone to the trouble of agreeing upon definite limitations, it is
judicial contract-making to disregard the plain meaning of the writing
and to hold that all that is required is substantial compliance. Those
cases which adopt the position that such provisions are ineffective
would therefore seem to be untenable. However, much can be said
for the validity of the other two views. Whether the demand is
timely made may logically be considered a controversy "arising out
of or relating to" the arbitration contract, and where the contract con-
tains such a broad clause, it is not unreasonable to hold that the
determination of such an issue lies within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the arbitrators. On the other hand, whether a party has made his
claim or demand within a certain fixed period may be regarded as a
simple question of fact and not a controversy within the meaning of
the contract. Under such a theory, the jurisdiction of the arbi-
trators is dependent upon the timeliness of the demand, and only a
court can determine such jurisdiction.
While the Court of Appeals has never been presented with this
precise question, it may be profitable to examine analogous situations
decided by that court. Matter of Lipmcan r5 may well be cited by
adherents of the middle view which holds that the question of time-
liness, and indeed of jurisdiction, is a matter for the arbitrators them-
selves to determine. In that case, the parties executed a contract
containing an arbitration clause. Subsequently, the parties executed
a new contract which had no such clause and which made no refer-
ence to the earlier contract. Petitioner moved for an order directing
arbitration and respondent contested on the ground that the subse-
quent contract had cancelled the earlier one together with its arbitra-
tion clause. Special Term granted the motion to the extent of order-
ing a trial to determine this question of law, and, if the prior
contract was found not to have been cancelled, then to proceed to
arbitration. The Appellate Division modified the judgment by grant-
ing the order absolutely,5 6 and upon appeal the Court of Appeals
affirmed as modified. In so holding, the court implemented Section
1450 which requires an order directing arbitration where there is no
substantial issue as to the mking of the contract. Here the question
was not as to the making of the contract, but rather as to its rescis-
sion. Therefore, the order to arbitrate must be granted and the
55 289 N. Y. 76, 43 N. E. 2d 817 (1942).
56 263 App. Div. 880, 32 N. Y. S. 2d 351 (2d Dep't 1942).
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question of whether the prior contract containing the arbitration
clause is in force or whether the subsequent one had rescinded it is
a matter for the arbitrators to decide under the prior contract which
provided that all controversies arising "out of" or "in connection
with" the contract be submitted to arbitration. Thus the arbitrators
themselves were given the task of deciding whether they had
jurisdiction.
A recent decision of the Court of Appeals in River Brand Rice
Mills v. Latrobe Brewing Co.57 may well encourage proponents of
the strict statute of limitations view. Here the issue decided was
whether an action could be maintained on the contract at law after
an injunction had issued restraining complainant from proceeding
with arbitration. Answering this question in the negative, the Court
of Appeals in effect affirmed the Appellate Division's 58 recognition
of a Special Term holding that arbitration was barred by failure to
demand it within the five-day period. But if the proponents of the
view that such time limits are not statutes of limitations were dis-
heartened by the decision in the River Brand Rice Mills case, they
have cause to see in it a method of avoiding the harshness of such a
rule. The court there stated that upon a proper showing, it may be
held that the time limitation contained therein is so unreasonably
harsh as to be unenforceable. 59 This dictum is in sharp contrast to
the only other arbitration case which considered this point. In Matter
of Leo Crisafulli, Inc.,60 it was urged that an identical five-day period
was unreasonable and void. The court rejected the contention stat-
ing that "[a] limitation upon the right of arbitration is unlike one
upon the right to bring suit and the court is not to consider whether
the limitation is reasonable or unreasonable." 61 It would appear,
however, that this is an ill-decided case.
In determining the reasonableness of time limitations, we must
turn to other contractual fields, there being no arbitration cases other
than the Crisafulli case on the subject. Bills of lading and insurance
cases are especially illuminating. In these cases, a sharp distinction
is drawn between provisions which limit the time within which ac-
tions may be commenced and those which limit the time within which
notice of claim must be made as a condition precedent to the bring-
ing of an action. The importance of this distinction lies in the fact
that while limitations on the right to sue are looked on with disfavor,6 2
those placed on the timeliness of notice of claims are considered valu-
able aids in apprising a defendant of the facts upon which he may
57 305 N. Y. 36, 110 N. E. 2d 545 (1953).
58 280 App. Div. 247, 113 N. Y. S. 2d 132 (1st Dep't 1952).
59 Supra note 57 at 41, 110 N. E. 2d at 547.60 98 N. Y. L. J. 202, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. July 22, 1937).
61 Ibid.
62 See Hauer Const. Co. v. City of New York, 193 Misc. 747, 749, 85
N. Y. S. 2d 42, 44 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
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base a contest.6 3 Consequently, what may be considered as a reason-
able time within which to require a notice of claim may well be con-
sidered unreasonable when applied to the time within which to in-
stitute an action.
One of the earliest cases to consider this question was that of
Express Co. v. Caldwell. 4 There, the Supreme Court of the United
States stated that a contractual stipulation in a bill of lading providing
for a ninety-day limitation within which to make a claim was not a
conventional limitation on the right to sue. The injured party is left
at liberty to sue at any time within the period fixed by the statute of
limitations. He is only required to make his claim within the desig-
nated period, and, having made it, he may delay his suit. This dis-
tinction has been recognized and followed in at least two New York
Court of Appeals cases. In South & Central American Commercial
Co. v. Panama R. R.,65 it was observed in passing on the reasonable-
ness of the limitation that "[w] e are not to confuse a limitation for
a preliminary notice with one for the institution of suit." 66 Simi-
larly, the court in Aron & Co. v. Panama R. R.67 expressed the
caveat that this distinction should be kept in mind.68
Despite the existence of these definitive statements of the Court
of Appeals prior to the first reported arbitration case dealing with
contractual limitations, only one such case has ever made reference
to the distinction. In Matter of Raphael (Silberberg),69 the limita-
tion was one on the making of a claim and the Appellate Division
held that such a limitation was in the nature of a condition precedent
rather than a statute of limitations, and hence the question of com-
pliance was strictly one for the determination of the arbitrators. A
logical deduction from this holding would be that if the limitation
were one on the time within which arbitration must be demanded or
initiated, then it would be in the nature of a statute of limitations
which is a matter of defense to be considered exclusively by the court.
Such a theory would be in full agreement with the overwhelming
majority of cases in the bill of lading and insurance fields.70 Of the
twelve other cases, the opinions of which specify the type of limita-
tion involved, nine reach the results which would be obtained if the
above thesis were adopted as the applicable rule of law. It is sub-
63 See Express Co. v. Caldwell, 21 Wall. 264, 268-269 (U. S. 1874).
64 See note 63 s=pra.
65237 N. Y. 287, 142 N. E. 666 (1923).
66 Id. at 292, 142 N. E. at 668.
67 255 N. Y. 513, 175 N. E. 273 (1931).
68 Id. at 519, 175 N. E. at 275.
69 274 App. Div. 625, 86 N. Y. S. 2d 421 (1st Dep't 1949), reversing 192
Misc. 489, 80 N. Y. S. 2d 763 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
70 See Osterhoudt v. Southern Pac. Co., 47 App. Div. 146, 62 N. Y. S. 2d
134 (3d Dep't 1900); Cudahy Packing Co. v. Munson S.S. Line, 22 F. 2d 898
(2d Cir. 1927) ; Green Star S.S. Co. v. Nanyang Bros. Tobacco Co., 3 F. 2d
369 (9th Cir. 1925); The Sagadahoc, 291 Fed. 920 (W. D. Wash. 1923).
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mitted that the propounded rule is logical and workable, and would
eliminate the confusion now existing in the field of arbitration.
What is a reasonable time?
Whether we follow one or the other of the above-mentioned
theories, whether we leave it to the court or to the arbitrators, it is
necessary to form a basis for determining what is a reasonable time.
Here again, the decisions have been by no means harmonious. As
indicated supra, Section 10 of the Civil Practice Act specifically per-
mits the adoption of shorter limitations than those enumerated in the
statute. The courts have construed this provision to require in all
circumstances a reasonable time, and if a shorter time prescribed by
the contract is unreasonable, the clause is not binding.71 While the
majority of states have no statutory provisions authorizing the mak-
ing of such clauses, at least six states declare them void.72  It is in-
teresting to note that the proposed Uniform Statute of Limitations
Act 73 declares that no agreement for a period of limitation different
from that prescribed in the Act shall be valid. The apparent effect of
such provisions is to declare shorter limitations unreasonable as a
matter of law.
The early cases indicate that the courts were loath to declare
contractual limitations unreasonable. But with the enactment of re-
strictions by the various states and by the Federal Government, the
courts began to revise their concepts of what is or is not reasonable.74
Although as late as 1927 a 48-hour limitation on the time within
which to file a notice of claim was held reasonable,7 5 generally periods
of less than 30 days run great risk of being declared invalid.76 The
7 See PRASHICER, NEw YORK PRACTICE 29 (2d ed. 1951).72 AL-A. CODE tit. 7, §28 (1940); FLA. STAT. tit. 8, c. 95, §95.03 (1951);
KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. c. 60, § 306 (1949) ; Mo. REv. STAT. c. 431, § 431.030(1949) ; OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, §216 (1951) ; S. C. CODE tit. 10, § 10-116 (1952).
73 Section 4. Although approved by the Commissioners, this statute has
not yet been adopted by any jurisdiction.
74 See South & Central American Com. Co. v. Panama R. R., 237 N. Y.
287, 142 N. E. 666 (1923); The President Polk, 43 F. 2d 695 (2d Cir. 1930) ;
W. R. Grace & Co. v. Panama R. R., 12 F. 2d 338 (2d Cir. 1926); Green
Star S.S. Co. v. Nanyang Bros. Tobacco Co., supra note 70. But see Sapinkopf
v. Cunard S.S. Co., 254 N. Y. 111, 172 N. E. 259 (1930), reversing 226 App.
Div. 504, 235 N. Y. Supp. 89 (1st Dep't 1929) ; Cudahy Packing Co. v. Munson
S.S. Line, supra note 70.
75 Cudahy Packing Co. v. Munson S.S. Line, 22 F. 2d 898 (2d Cir. 1927).
76 See Jennings v. Grand Trunk Ry. of Canada, 127 N. Y. 438 (1891)
(36 hours); Hanna v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Accid. Ass'n of America,
204 App. Div. 258, 260, 197 N. Y. Supp. 395, 397 (1st Dep't 1922) (dissenting
opinion) (10 days) ; Southern Ry. v. Mooresville Cotton Mills, 187 Fed. 72
(4th Cir. 1911) (10 and 30 days) ; Central Vermont R. R. v. Soper, 59 Fed.
879 (1st Cir. 1894) (30 days); Southern Express Co. v. Caperton, 44 Ala.
101 (1870) (30 days); Cox v. Vermont Cent. R. R., 170 Mass. 129, 49
N. E. 97 (1898) (30 days).
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Texas statute eliminates this uncertainty by declaring limitations of
less than 90 days on the right to file notice of claim unreasonable as
a matter of law.7 7 Limitations on the right to bring an action are
correspondingly longer, but periods of less than three months would
appear to be unreasonable.78 Here again, the Texas statute declares
periods of less than two years invalid.79
A survey of the pertinent cases indicates that the standard period
designated in arbitration contracts for both types of limitation varies
from three to fifteen days. These clauses are frequently found in
contracts for the sale of textiles, foods and other merchandise intended
to be processed and sold by the buyer to an ultimate consumer. In
such contracts, five- or ten-day limitations are clearly unrealistic and
would appear to be unreasonable. In Matter of Leo Crisafulli, Inc.,80
it was argued that the limitation of five days was not intended to
apply to a claim not ascertainable until after the product had been
resold and used by the consumer for cooking purposes. The court
rejected the argument stating that the parties were competent to con-
tract for any limitation they saw fit, and that since the limitation is
unlike one on the right to bring suit, the court is not to consider
whether the limitation is reasonable or unreasonable. While not an
arbitration case, Jessel v. Lockwood Textile Corp.81 would seem to
formulate the proper rule to be applied to such a case. There the
contract was for the sale of shirting goods, and contained a clause
that no claims should be allowed after ten days or after the goods
had been cut. In reversing the trial court 8 2 which had disallowed
the claim made after ten days and after the goods had been cut, the
Appellate Division remanded the case to determine whether the de-
fects were discoverable before the goods had been manufactured into
shirts. It held that where the defects were latent, such a short claim
period will not be conclusive.
In view of the Jessel case and the dictum of the Court of Ap-
peals in the River Brand Rice Mills case, it is to be hoped that the
gross disparity between the law applicable to arbitration and that
77 T ,x. STAT. art. 5546 (Vernon, 1948). See also 46 STAT. 252 (1930),
49 U. S. C. § 20(11) (1946) (Interstate Commerce Act) (9 months minimum
limitation on filing claim); 49 STAT. 960 (1935), 46 U. S. C. § 183b (1946)(Shipping Act) (6 months minimum limitation on giving notice of, or filing,
claim).
78 See South & Central American Com. Co. v. Panama R. R., mipra note
74 (60 days) ; The President Polk, spra note 74 (30 days) ; Green Star S.S.
Co. v. Nanyang Bros. Tobacco Co., 3 F. 2d 369 (9th Cir. 1925) (3 months).
But see The Eldridge, 295 Fed. 696 (W. D. Wash. 1924) (40 days); The
Sagadahoc, 291 Fed. 920 (W. I). Wash. 1923) (2 months).
79 Tx. STAT. art. 5545 (Vernon, 1948). See also 38 STAT. 1197 (1915),
49 U. S. C. § 20(11) (1946) (Interstate Commerce Act) (2 years); 49 STAT.
960 (1935), 46 U. S. C. § 183b (1946) (Shipping Act) (1 year).80 98 N. Y. L. J. 202, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. July 22, 1937).
81276 App. Div. 378, 95 N. Y. S. 2d 77 (1st Dept 1950).
82 80 N. Y. S. 2d 607 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
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applicable to other contractual fields will be diminished, and that a
rule of reason will be implemented in disposing of cases brought
under the Arbitration Law.
Laches and Waiver
Strictly speaking, the problem of laches and waiver does not
properly come under the topic of time limitations due to the fact that
time is only one of the many elements upon which these defenses are
based. In discussing laches and waiver, the courts rarely distinguish
between the two legal concepts and frequently use them interchange-
ably. Waiver, on the one hand, is a voluntary relinquishment of a
known right 88 and generally involves an affirmative act whereby the
party against whom the waiver is invoked signifies his intention not
to insist upon his rights. Laches, on the other, is a doctrine which
precludes a person from exercising rights which he has failed to
assert within a reasonable time, and the exercise of which would
cause an unconscionable degree of harm to the person against whom
the right is sought to be enforced. It is a judicial denial as distin-
guished from a voluntary relinquishment of one's rights, and is ex-
ercised by the court out of its inherent equity power to prevent
injustice.
Acquiescing in the court's all-inclusive use of the term waiver,
arbitration cases involving this defense may generally be reduced to
three categories:
1. waiver caused by refusal to arbitrate;
2. waiver caused by election of remedies; and
3. waiver caused by delay (more properly, laches).
Refusal to arbitrate upon due demand of the opposite party has been
held to constitute a waiver.84 It may well be, however, that refusal
to arbitrate is, in effect, an election of remedies and hence may be
treated under that heading. The question is, in all cases, one of
degree and intent.8 5 How far one can go without waiving his right
is determined by the specific factual situation, but, as in all factual
determinations, there are maximum and minimum areas where the
law has become quite crystallized. Thus, with few exceptions,8 6 the
83 See Ansorge v. Belfer, 248 N. Y. 145, 150, 161 N. E. 450, 452 (1928).
84 Bennington Corp. v. Citation Fabrics Corp., 127 N. Y. L. J. 825, col. 2
(Sup. Ct. Feb. 29, 1952); Beaver Concrete Breaking Co. v. Baxendale, 125
N. Y. L. J. 223, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1951); see Nagy v. Arcas Brass &
Iron Co., 242 N. Y. 97, 98, 150 N. E. 614 (1926).
85 See Matter of Young v. Crescent Development Co., 240 N. Y. 244, 252,
148 N. E. 510, 512 (1925).88 See Matter of Cia. Naviera Veragua S. A., 129 N. Y. L. J. 381, col. 1
(Sup. Ct. Feb. 3, 1953) (held that although petitioner had brought suit in
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initiation of an action at law on a matter embraced by the arbitration
contract is a waiver of one's right subsequently to abandon the action
and proceed to arbitration.8 7 Similarly, the assertion of a cross-
complaint 88 or a counterclaim 89 has been held to be such a waiver.
Nor need this affirmative act be in the nature of an action at law.
Although such a result has now been specifically excepted by statute,9 0
service of a notice requiring the respondent to enforce his rights at
law within a period designated in the Lien Law 91 was held to con-
stitute a waiver.9 2
More difficult, however, is the determination of whether the
interposition of an answer constitutes a waiver. Although it has
been held that the service of an answer alone would effect a waiver, 93
it must be shown that the defendant had knowledge of the arbitra-
tion clause prior to answering.94 However, where the answer not
only traverses the complaint, but sets up the existence of the arbitra-
tion clause, it has been held that such an assertion amounts to the
reservation of the right to arbitrate and indicates an intention not to
waive.95 On the other hand, the mere assertion of the arbitration
clause in the answer will not preserve the defendant's rights where
he has proceeded so far in the action that the assertion is inconsis-
tent with his conduct in the matter.96 Thus, where the defendant
attempted to evade the service of complaint by various motions, finally
accepted service and then moved for change of venue, his actions
were so inconsistent with the assertion of a right to arbitrate that a
waiver was found.9 7 Similarly, where the defendant made a demand
Dutch court to preserve rights under contract, he is not deemed to have waived
if Dutch action is promptly discontinued).
87 Oklahoma Pub. Co. v. Parsons & Whittemore, Inc., 255 App. Div. 589,
8 N. Y. S. 2d 432 (1st Dep't 1938) ; Matter of Cotton Prod., Inc. (Joan Iris
Corp.), 125 N. Y. L. J. 259, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 22, 1951); see Matter of
Rice (Reilly), 203 Misc. 1033, 1034, 118 N. Y. S. 2d 75, 76 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
ss Pagani v. Nelson, 125 N. Y. L. J. 1623, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. May 3, 1951).
89 Matter of Nathan Assoc., Inc. (Murray Hill Const. Corp.), 268 N. Y.
692, 198 N. E. 561 (1935); Matter of Zimmerman v. Cohen, 236 N. Y. 15,
139 N. E. 764 (1923).90N. Y. LmN LA-W § 35.
91 Id. §59.92 Matter of Young v. Crescent Development Co., 240 N. Y. 244, 148 N. E.
510 (1925).
0s Matter of Bauer Co., 206 App. Div. 423, 201 N. Y. Supp. 438 (1st Dep't
1923); see Burton v. Klaw, 129 N. Y. L. J. 329, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 29,
1953).
94 Matter of Ted Stoppick & Co. (Ernest Glick Co.), 127 N. Y. L. J. 957,
col. 1 (Sup. Ct. Mar. 10, 1952).
95 Matter of Hosiery Mfrs. Corp. v. Goldston, 238 N. Y. 22, 143 N. E. 779
(1924); Matter of W. E. Hedger Transp. Corp. v. Miller, 166 Misc. 77,
1 N. Y. S. 2d 345 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
98 Simadiras v. Hotel Waldorf Astoria, 128 N. Y. L. J. 1522, col. 3 (1st
Dep't Dec. 17, 1952); Hallis Builders, Inc. v. Rickard Apt's, Inc., 123 N. Y.
L. J. 198, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 17, 1950).
91 Goldschmidt v. Blum, 124 N. Y. L. J. 161, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. July 31,
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for a bill of particulars, served a notice to take testimony, examined
the respondent before trial and moved for a preclusion order, the
court held that under such circumstances, it could hardly be held that
the petitioner did other than waive its right to arbitrate even though
asserting such right in the answer.98 But where the defendant moved
for a dismissal or in the alternative that the alleged complaint be
separately stated, no waiver was found since the defendant had the
right to test the sufficiency of the complaint before an imperative
duty of election arose.99
An exception to the rule that service of an answer alone consti-
tutes a waiver is found in the situation where the defendant serves,
as of course, an amended answer alleging the arbitration contract.
The reason for this exception lies in the fact that since the first an-
swer was amendable at the will of the defendant within the time
allowed in the statute, there could be no waiver until that period had
expired. 10 0
A finding of waiver by means of laches may be justified by any
unreasonable delay in making proper application for arbitration.
Thus, where the respondent made no demand to inspect the peti-
tioner's production records until 30 months after the expiration of
a contract by which petitioner was to sell respondent 40% of its
production, it was held that the unexplained delay in making the de-
mand constituted laches and was a waiver of the contract. 10 ' Simi-
larly, a delay of six years in making a demand for arbitration was
held to be a bar.1
0 2
A finding of waiver by reason of election of remedies is fre-
quently accompanied by a finding of laches since it is generally only
after a defendant has been unable to resist the prosecution of an
action at law that he will demand arbitration as a last resort. In
Matter of Nathan Associates, Inc., 0 3 the defendant served a notice
for arbitration only after the City Court action in which he had been
1950) ; see Matter of De Costa, 123 N. Y. L. J. 123, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 11,
1950).
98 National Container Corp. v. Costello, 129 N. Y. L. J. 345, col. 6 (Sup.
Ct. Jan. 30, 1953).
99 Matter of Haupt v. Rose, 265 N. Y. 108, 191 N. E. 853 (1934).
00 Short v. Nat. Sports Fashions, Inc., 264 App. Div. 284, 35 N. Y. S. 2d
169 (1st Dep't 1942). But cf. Matter of Bauer Co., 206 App. Div. 423, 201
N. Y. Supp. 438 (1st Dep't 1923), where the plaintiff served his complaint, the
defendant answered, the plaintiff amended his complaint and the defendant
then made demand for arbitration. The court there held that the subsequent
service of a demand for arbitration did not cure the 'defect of failing to allege
the arbitration contract in the original answer, and hence the original waiver
remained unaffected.
101 Matter of Stoneville Furniture Co., 123 N. Y. L. J. 784, col. 2 (Sup. Ct.
Mar. 3, 1950).
102 Feinberg v. Magagna, 127 N. Y. L. J. 956, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. Mar. 10,
1952).
103 268 N. Y. 692, 198 N. E. 561 (1935).
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served appeared on the day calendar for trial, and several adjourn-
ments had been had at defendant's request. In denying defendant's
application, Special Term characterized his actions as dilatory tactics
and a waiver of the right of arbitration.10 4
Conclusion
The impartial prohibitions of a time limitation often preclude
redress for a just claim through arbitration. When the legislature
enacts a statute of limitations, thereby sacrificing individual justice
to the needs of the majority, it must carefully weigh its decision in
order that the time set is reasonable. Since contractual limitations
have a similar effect upon bona fide claims, the courts should see to
it that reasonable necessity and not caprice justifies their enforcement.
In view of the confusion confronting the bench and the bar with re-
spect to these contractual limitations, it would appear that an amend-
ment to Section 1448 of the Civil Practice Act should be made. This
amendment would state in substance that no agreement or contract
shall be valid which limits the period within which notice of claim
must be given, or a claim filed, to a period of less than 90 days. It
is submitted that such a period is just and reasonable in every situa-
tion that might arise, yet would prevent such a limitation from being
a mere cloak for denial of a remedy.
SOME PROBLEMS OF DUAL NATIONALITY
Introduction
Citizenship is regulated by municipal, rather than international
law.1 Each nation forms its own rules as to the manner in which its
citizenship may be acquired and in which it may be terminated. In
determining a person's nationality at birth, some nations adhere to
the doctrine of jus soli, i.e., citizenship is determined by birth within
the country. In others the status depends upon Jus sanguinis, i.e.,
nationality is inherited from the parents regardless of place of birth.
104 Accord, Burton v. Klaw, 129 N. Y. L. J. 329, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 29,
1953); Matter of De Costa, 123 N. Y. L. J. 123, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 11,
1950).
' See Perkins v. Elg, 307 U. S. 325, 329 (1939) ; Tomasicchio v. Acheson,
98 F. Supp. 166, 169 (D. D. C. 1951); see Note, 25 MINN. L. REv. 348(1941).
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